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As I write this review, spell-checked with red lines and grammar checked with green—
trusting that the machinery of the electronic world will deliver the review to the editor and 
then, again machine-processed, to the reader, it is hard not to agree with David Gunkel that 
the conventional boundaries between human and machine are increasingly blurred. 
 
Perhaps nowhere are those boundaries more blurry than in the area of communications 
technology, where less and less of our communication takes place unmediated by the 
devices that shape, control and enable conversation at a distance. 
 
As Gunkel observes, these devices are designed and programmed in such a way to mimic 
human interaction so successfully that the Turingesque goal—of fooling customers into 
thinking that the supplier really cares about their satisfaction and will accommodate 
requests to ensure it—is closer by the upgrade. We daily find ourselves in electronic queues, 
logging in, downloading, responding like Pavlov’s dog to whatever these tools require of us 
to grant access to some anticipated treasure. 
 
The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots and Ethics is Gunkel’s 
exploration of human-machine interaction, focused on the questions around ethics that it 
raises. While the normal set of ethical questions would reflect on how humans use machines 
to do things and the moral dimensions of such activity, he takes an entirely different tack: 
whether machines are or will ever be deserving of moral consideration themselves. 
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More specifically, The Machine Question provides a philosophical topography of the 
interactions between humans and machines from the perspective of the fundamental issues 
raised by the study of ethics. Should machines become autonomous, what does this mean? 
And to what extent does autonomy—which for Gunkel goes beyond the idea that machines 
and their activities are merely the product of human intent and design—entail moral 
consideration as a result? 
 
From the opening pages, The Machine Question is a delightful mélange of graduate 
philosophy seminars, solemn debates at science fiction conventions, and weighty 
discussion over drinks in dimly-lit drinking establishments. It is delightful mainly 
because such diversity of approach, content and examples is too rarely found in an 
academic publication. As a consequence, the book is a challenging read for those whose 
own background is less eclectic. 
 
For myself, having read virtually everything Isaac Asimov ever wrote and wistfully having 
been too young to see 2001: A Space Odyssey on its release, I would likely join the bevy of 
sci-fi buffs who would challenge and debate the examples Gunkel uses. Yet he manages 
deftly to include the issues raised in cinema and literature about the Machine, ranging back 
to Rene Descartes and forward to engage both Mary Shelley (as author of Frankenstein) and 
Mary Wollstonecraft (as author of The Vindication of the Rights of Women), en route to the 
land ethic of Aldo Leopold and ending with Martin Heidegger’s “Thing.” 
 
In searching for the right words to describe his book, therefore, “philosophical topography” 
(though not suggested by my electronic thesaurus) seemed the most apt. Whatever quibbles 
or objections that might be raised about certain of the features of the ethical landscape he 
depicts, my book is full of underlines and marginal comments on the insights he offers, 
either of his own or of others, about the question itself. 
 
It is “the question,” however, that defines the topography. Rather than select an answer to 
whether machines will ever deserve ethical consideration, Gunkel sidesteps the inevitable 
duality of the yes/no response. Instead, he takes the path of deconstruction, arguing that the 
reason we find ourselves impaled on the horns of such a duality is because of how we have 
defined the terms of the debate. 
 
In the first of the three chapters that constitute his book, he deconstructs the meaning of 
moral agency. He demonstrates the inevitable anthropocentrism of such a question, how it 
turns ethics into an exclusionary exercise in which, depending on what category in which 
potential “agents” are placed, the answer is effectively predetermined. Whether the circle is 
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drawn large or small, there are still those found outside of it because there is some 
deficiency in terms of what those inside possess as “agents.” 
 
In the second chapter, he considers the flipside of moral agency (moral patiency), as moral 
patients are the objects of moral consideration even if they are not agents themselves. 
Gunkel delves into the parallels to animal rights, how animals (while lacking moral agency 
as defined in Cartesian terms) are still worthy of moral consideration. The self-conscious 
circle of “agency,” however, is replaced by another (though larger) circle of “patiency.” 
Again, the operation is exclusionary. 
 
Gunkel’s philosophical map-making is obviously intended to draw the reader toward to the 
third and final chapter, “Thinking Otherwise.” One would expect this to provide the 
alternative to the dualities reflected in determining either moral agency or moral patiency, 
and certainly the first part of the chapter looks promising. But here, again, Gunkel advances, 
elucidates and then dismisses—I think hastily—the options that he presents. For example, 
the “fundamental reorientation” of ontology he finds in the work of Emmanuel Levinas 
receives short shrift, as does its extension by Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco. To accept 
the perfunctory dismissal of Derrida that such ideas are undermined by their “humanist” 
tendencies, after such an exhaustive tour of alternatives, raises suspicions that the 
philosophical topography is more of a shaggy dog story, without satisfactory conclusion. 
 
The subsequent move toward Heidegger, moreover, is even less lucid than Heidegger’s 
work itself. To find in “The Question Concerning Technology” and Being and Time a better 
answer as to whether machines deserve moral consideration—one that is somehow less 
“humanistic” or dualistic than other options—strains the limits of credulity. While I 
appreciate the concepts Heidegger advanced, especially in his discussions of the nature of 
technology, the idea of the “standing reserve” of potential awaiting human discovery or use 
reifies technology in unacceptable ways. It is an ontological error, parallel to the equivalent 
reification and similar error reflected in discussions of “the Machine.” 
 
In fact, I found a much more palatable option in his discussion of Leopold’s “land ethic.” 
Gunkel observes it is the whole of the relation that is worthy of moral consideration, not by 
any individual virtue of agency or patiency, but entirely because it is situated within myriad 
relationships, each of which are important in some crucial way to the health and viability of 
the whole. This would seem to be “thinking otherwise,” as the eventual object of the book 
ostensibly was to be. 
 
I use these words deliberately, because for all my amusement, marginalia and furrowed 
brows throughout his book, the concluding pages were the least satisfactory. I had assumed 
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that there was an end to the journey, that the commentaries on such a wide variety of 
topographical features were akin to the pages of a guidebook, leading toward some 
destination, some reason for undertaking the trip. 
 
This turned out not to be the case. While Gunkel might claim this kind of resolution was 
never his intention, the elaboration and reasoned dismissals along the way led me to expect 
that there would be something tangible at the end, even if it was defined more by exclusion 
from all those elements that proved unsatisfactory. Reaching the final pages, I did not feel 
any closer to a resolution of the question as to whether machines deserve moral 
consideration than I was at the beginning. 
 
To be fair, this is the nature of a topographical map, philosophical or otherwise. It is not 
something that leads to a destination, not some guidebook for the journey but a description 
of the features of the landscape—what things look like, rather than what they mean or why.  
 
From this perspective, Gunkel’s book is worth reading and will likely find a place in 
courses dealing with the problems reflected in its title. Artificial intelligence, robots, 
machine ethics—these things are all au courant and the subject of much discussion, 
however fruitless in the end he might feel such discussion to be. He does a good job of 
surveying the landscape, identifying its prominent features, exploring the ideas that are 
represented, and so on, and for these reasons, I would recommend The Machine Question. 
 
For me, however, the most interesting outcome is his challenge to “think otherwise.” His 
ontological deconstruction of the issues of moral agency and moral patiency lead me to 
consider another response to the insoluble duality of exclusionary ethics. 
 
I suggest, “thinking otherwise,” that the question as to whether machines deserve 
moral consideration is derived in a time and culture whose perspectives necessitated 
duality. Rather than focusing on Heidegger, it would have been more fruitful for 
Gunkel to focus more on the implications of the Cartesian split between res cogitans 
and res extensa, specifically what it meant to be “human” within Renaissance and 
Enlightenment perspectives. 
 
What if, for example, the insoluble duality reflect in “Man or Machine” is the product, not 
of the scaling up of machines to match, first animals, and then humans, but the scaling down 
to animalistic and mechanical terms of what it means to be “human”? In the Machine Age, 
have machines become more human, or have we become less? 
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Perhaps the wisest words, in the end, are those that Lieutenant Commander Data (of Star 
Trek: Next Generation fame) received from the judge in answer to “the question,” as 
Gunkel notes (44). It is not whether or not machines have a soul that matters, but whether 
they—like us—are free to find out the answer for themselves.  
 
